#Postgres set password password
If a password was encrypted using the scram-sha-256 setting, then it can be used for the authentication methods scram-sha-256 and password (but password transmission will be in plain text in the latter case). This is controlled by the configuration parameter password_encryption at the time the password is set. The availability of the different password-based authentication methods depends on how a user's password on the server is encrypted (or hashed, more accurately). If no password has been set up for a user, the stored password is null and password authentication will always fail for that user. Passwords can be managed with the SQL commands CREATE ROLE and ALTER ROLE, e.g., CREATE ROLE foo WITH LOGIN PASSWORD 'secret', or the psql command \password. The password for each database user is stored in the pg_authid system catalog. PostgreSQL database passwords are separate from operating system user passwords. (Though SSL certificate authentication might be a better choice if one is depending on using SSL). If the connection is protected by SSL encryption then password can be used safely, though.
The method password sends the password in clear-text and is therefore vulnerable to password “ sniffing” attacks. To ease transition from the md5 method to the newer SCRAM method, if md5 is specified as a method in pg_hba.conf but the user's password on the server is encrypted for SCRAM (see below), then SCRAM-based authentication will automatically be chosen instead. The md5 method cannot be used with the db_user_namespace feature. Also, the MD5 hash algorithm is nowadays no longer considered secure against determined attacks. It prevents password sniffing and avoids storing passwords on the server in plain text but provides no protection if an attacker manages to steal the password hash from the server. The method md5 uses a custom less secure challenge-response mechanism. This is the most secure of the currently provided methods, but it is not supported by older client libraries. It is a challenge-response scheme that prevents password sniffing on untrusted connections and supports storing passwords on the server in a cryptographically hashed form that is thought to be secure. That closes a slight security hole.The method scram-sha-256 performs SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication, as described in RFC 7677.
I took RichVel's advice and made the file unreadable before putting the password into it. For multiple users, (but the default connection) change that line to psql mydb jdoeĭon't forget to make the script executable withĬhmod +x runpsql ( or whatever you called the script file)
Note the use of the chmod command at line 4 - just like the " not a plain file" error that mightybyte described, there's also a " permissions" error if this is not done.Īt line 7, you won't have to use the -h myserver, the -p myport, or -U jdoe flag if you use the defaults ( localhost : 5432) and only have one database user. The double dollar sign ( $$) in /tmp/pgpasswd$$ at line 2 appends the process ID number to the file name, so that this script can be run more than once, even simultaneously, without side effects. Building on mightybyte's answer for those who aren't comfortable with *nix shell scripting, here's a working script: #!/bin/shĮcho "myserver:5432:mydb:jdoe:password" > $PGPASSFILE
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